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Abstract  
In this article, I examine the legal position of those who perform caregiving work within the 
context of a cohabiting relationship through a novel relational vulnerability lens. I argue that 
the state, through privatising and devaluing caregiving labour, situates carers within an unequal 
and imbalanced relational framework, exposing them economic, emotional, and spatial harms. 
Unlike universal vulnerability, which is inherent and unavoidable, relational vulnerability can 
be avoided and reduced if the state were to acknowledge that humans are embodied and 
relational rather than self-sufficient and rational. Law’s treatment of cohabiting carers reflects 
the state’s broader tendency to value economic self-sufficiency, while confining caregiving to 
the private family. I argue that the state has a duty to respond directly to relational vulnerability 
and should aim to make cohabiting carers resilient. Resilience must involve the provision of 
material resources but should also have a normative commitment to achieving autonomy and 
equality for those marginalised by law and state policies.  
Introduction 
Feminist legal scholars have criticised English law’s lack of concern for those who compromise 
their earning capacity to raise a family or perform other caregiving or socially reproductive 
labour1 in the context of an unmarried relationship (Barlow et al. 2008; Barlow 2007; Douglas 
et al. 2009; Bottomley and Wong 2006). I adopt a novel approach to the debate through the 
                                                 
1 The term ‘social reproduction’ is defined as “biological reproduction; unpaid production in the home (both goods and 
services); social provisioning … the reproduction of culture and ideology; and the provision of sexual, emotional and affective 
services (such as are required to maintain family and intimate relationships)” (Hoskyns and Rai 2007, 300). Although the 
article predominantly focuses on caregiving, many of the cases also involve other unpaid work, such as looking after the home 
or working unpaid in the family business. 
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development of a ‘relational vulnerability’ framework that I employ as a lens through which to 
analyse the modern-day legal position of cohabiting carers, acknowledging that society has 
moved on from the image of the caregiver as the traditional, financially inactive housewife, 
around which much feminist analysis in the 1980s and 1990s was based. However, as I argue, 
many of the issues that troubled feminists three decades ago remain today, albeit that they have 
been rendered more complex by an increasingly neoliberal political landscape.  
I argue that cohabiting carers are relationally vulnerable, meaning that they are situated within 
an unequal network of relationships in which they are marginalised, and exposed to harm on 
an economic, emotional, and spatial level. I examine how ostensibly private interpersonal 
relationships are shaped by wider forces, including law (Nedelsky 2011). Relationships where 
one party undertakes all or most of the caregiving and socially reproductive labour are 
inherently unequal because the state does not adequately value or acknowledge this type of 
work. Here, I employ a broad definition of state, acknowledging that “the domain we call the 
state is not a thing, system, or subject but a significantly unbounded terrain of powers and 
techniques, an ensemble of discourses, rules, and practices” (Brown 1992, 12). This article is 
predominantly concerned with how law constructs care as a gendered, unproductive, and 
privatised endeavour. However, my analysis must be viewed in its wider context, whereby care 
is devalued through various means, including public discourses, social policies, employment 
practices, and the administration of the welfare benefits system.  
I build upon and expand the boundaries of Martha Fineman’s influential theory of universal 
vulnerability, which has shaped the scholarship in this area. Fineman’s (2008, 2010, 2017) core 
thesis is that vulnerability is a constant and unavoidable state, arising from the embodied and 
socially embedded nature of the human condition. To be human is to be susceptible to “the 
ever-present possibility of harm and injury from mildly unfortunate to catastrophically 
devastating events” (Fineman 2008, 9). For Fineman (2010), the problem is not vulnerability 
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itself but, rather, that liberal and neoliberal state policies, laws, and institutions deny 
vulnerability, imagining instead that personhood is characterised by rationality, individualism, 
and self-sufficiency, thereby stigmatising those who cannot conform to the artificial ideal.  
Fineman (2008) is critical of suggestions that some individuals can be viewed as more, or less, 
vulnerable than others, as this, in her view, undermines the claim that vulnerability is a 
universal and constant state. Yet, my relational vulnerability framework, by focusing on the 
specific vulnerability of cohabiting homemakers, does claim that some are more vulnerable 
than others. The difference, I argue, is that we are discussing different things. I do not see 
vulnerability as having only one cause. Everyone is vulnerable by virtue of being human, but 
some are affected by additional vulnerabilities. Humans are inherently relational but being 
relational is not the same as being relationally vulnerable, the latter of which relates to where 
one’s relationships are unequal or unbalanced. Unlike universal vulnerability, relational 
vulnerability would be avoidable if the state, and law, were to foster positive and empowering 
relational networks.  
Relational vulnerability does not deny the existence of universal vulnerability. Indeed, the 
cause of relational vulnerability is a state failure to acknowledge the embodied and embedded 
human condition; that we are all to varying extents dependent on the care of others for our 
existence (Nedelsky 2011; Fineman 2017). Yet, the state does not value those who perform 
caregiving labour. Instead, its institutions, including law, are structured to marginalise care, 
depicting it as a labour of love with little value outside the private family unit. This 
marginalisation is mirrored in the cohabitation case law, where caregiving is reconfigured to 
suit the dominant construction of care as either commercialised and transformed into a bargain, 
or sentimentalised and deemed incompatible with financial recompense. Law relies on an 
atavistic and heteronormative conception of care as a woman’s relational role, which is 
evidenced in its greater tendency to commercialise domesticity where the claimant is male.  
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The relational vulnerability lens allows transformation of the existing discourse around 
cohabitation and relationship-generated disadvantage. It reconceptualises the hardships 
experienced by cohabiting carers as state-created rather than the self-inflicted results of poor 
choices. Whereas relationship-generated disadvantage has traditionally been understood purely 
as an economic imbalance, the relational vulnerability lens promotes a broader understanding 
of the impacts of performing caregiving work within a cohabiting relationship. This holistic 
conception of relational vulnerability, together with exposing the state’s vested interest in 
undervaluing care, prompts a change of approach, recognising the need for redressing the 
imbalances the state, through the legal framework, has helped to perpetuate.  
I begin by outlining law’s treatment of informal caregiving in the context of cohabitation, 
outlining the constructive trust and proprietary estoppel frameworks that govern rights in the 
family home. I then set out my theoretical framework, explaining that the way cohabitants are 
treated in law is based on an unrealistic image of a rational, autonomous legal subject. This 
contributes to the creation of relational vulnerability, which is a temporal condition arising 
during the relationship, but often with long-term impacts. Finally, I consider the question of 
resilience. Relational vulnerability is state-created and demands an urgent and active state 
response. Here, I consider the normative goals of caregiver resilience, mapping these against 
two hypothetical state responses to cohabiting carers.  
Cohabiting Carers and Relationship Generated Disadvantage: Legal Responses 
The imagined caregiver in this article is someone who, in the context of a cohabiting 
relationship, undertakes the majority of caring and socially reproductive labour, often giving 
up or compromising her earning capacity to do so. The most common scenario is undertaking 
childcare and assuming responsibility for the household, but some of the cases discussed also 
involve caring for an adult, such as elderly parents or parents-in-law. I should clarify here that 
my emphasis is on how cohabiting caregivers are treated in family and property law. I do not, 
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for instance, deal with the provisions of the Care Act 2014, which, although a ground-breaking 
piece of legislation in terms of giving legal status to carers, focuses predominantly on caring 
for adults, and would not be applicable in most of the cases discussed in this article. Cohabitants 
who compromise their earning capacity through caregiving are particularly disadvantaged 
because English law does not have a specific statutory regime for property redistribution upon 
cohabitation breakdown. By contrast, where the couple is married, it is now recognised that the 
court can financially compensate one spouse for “relationship generated disadvantage”,2 in 
recognition that “the marriage has deprived her of what otherwise she might have had”.3  
Disputes between unmarried couples over family property (usually the home) are dealt with by 
the ordinary law of property and trusts. A claimant seeking to assert a proprietary interest must 
establish a constructive trust based on the parties’ common intention. This can arise in one of 
two circumstances. The first is where the claimant is not a legal owner, but nonetheless asserts 
that there was an intention that she4 should have a beneficial share. If the parties expressly 
discussed ownership, the claimant can succeed if she shows that she relied on these discussions 
to her detriment by performing some act that she would not otherwise have done.5 
Alternatively, the court can infer a shared intention from the parties’ conduct.6 Where there 
have been express discussions, unpaid care could conceivably constitute detrimental reliance. 
However, the claimant must show that her contribution was motivated by the expectation of 
proprietary rights, which has been translated into a requirement that caring contributions be 
“out of the ordinary”7 and not motivated by other factors, such as natural affection, or a desire 
to improve the parties’ relationship.8  
                                                 
2 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24  
3 SRJ v DWJ [1999] 3 FCR 153, 160 (Hale J, as she then was)  
4 The feminine pronoun is used throughout to refer to either male or female persons 
5 See Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638 
6 Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107  
7 Thomson v Humphrey, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 3576, [44] (Warren J)  
8 See James v Thomas [2007] EWCA Civ 1212 
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Conduct from which intention can be inferred was traditionally interpreted narrowly, operating 
to the detriment of claimants relying on caregiving contributions. In his infamous speech in 
Lloyds Bank v Rosset, Lord Bridge declared that he was “extremely doubtful whether anything 
less than direct contributions to the purchase price by the partner who is not the legal owner”9 
would suffice to infer that the parties intended to share beneficial ownership. Although Rosset 
remains the highest authority on sole ownership, subsequent obiter comments suggest that 
“[t]he law has…moved on” and that common intention should now be gauged from the parties’ 
“whole course of conduct in relation to [the property]”.10 However, more recent sole ownership 
cases have been interpreted inconsistently by the lower courts, with some continuing to rely on 
Rosset, and others taking a more holistic approach, and so it is unclear the extent to which the 
law has moved on (Sloan 2015).  
In the second scenario, the parties are joint legal owners but are in dispute over the size of their 
respective beneficial shares. Following Stack v Dowden,11 where the parties are in a non-
commercial relationship, there is now a strong presumption that they intended equal beneficial 
shares, irrespective of whether they made unequal financial contributions to the purchase price. 
Therefore, the joint-owner carer will be prima facie entitled to a half share of the home, unless 
it can be established that the parties in fact intended unequal shares. Stack and the subsequent 
Supreme Court case, Jones v Kernott,12 have been praised for demonstrating a more family-
centred approach (Gardner and Davidson 2012; Hayward 2012). However, it would be an 
overstatement to claim that the presumption of an equal share has remedied the problem. As 
Baroness Hale recognised in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane, “[g]iving half the 
present assets to the breadwinner achieves a very different outcome from giving half the assets 
                                                 
9 Lloyds Bank v Rosset, n 6, p 133 (Lord Bridge)  
10 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [60] (Baroness Hale, as she then was)  
11 Ibid  
12 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 
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to the homemaker with children”.13 In particular, a caregiver may find that a lump sum will 
affect her eligibility for benefit payments if she is unable to use it to purchase another property.  
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel has significant overlaps with the constructive trust. Here, 
the claimant must show that she relied, to her detriment, on an assurance or promise by the 
owner that she was to have some interest in the home.14 It can be useful where the facts negate 
beneficial ownership, e.g. where a promise is made to make future provision by way of a will. 
Proprietary estoppel has been successfully pleaded in a number of cases where a claimant has 
undertaken unpaid care in return for a promise of future financial provision.15 However, it is 
remedially uncertain in that it does not guarantee the claimant a beneficial interest in property. 
Instead, the court must simply do the minimum necessary to satisfy the equity, which could 
mean an order for occupation or a monetary payment. Like the constructive trust, it requires 
evidence of an assurance or bargain of some sort; something that may be unrealistic in the 
context of an intimate relationship (Gardner 1993).  
The Changing Face of the Caregiver 
Any analysis of this area must take account of recent social and demographic changes to avoid 
reinforcing outdated stereotypes. As I argue in this section, the image of the cohabiting carer 
has undergone transformation over the past 40 years. Nonetheless, many of the old problems 
persist, albeit in a new and more complex form.  
In Burns v Burns16, Valerie Burns left her 20-year relationship in the mid-80s with no assets 
after the Court of Appeal rejected her claim for a constructive trust. The family home in which 
she had raised her children was owned by her partner. She could not point to evidence of an 
                                                 
13 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane, n 2, [136] (Baroness Hale)  
14 See Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18  
15 E.g. Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159; Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498; Wayling v Jones [1995] 69 
P&CR 170  
16 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317 
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express agreement that she was to have a share in it, and her caregiving and homemaking 
contributions were insufficient for the court to be able to infer a common intention of beneficial 
ownership. She was left destitute. The full extent of her fate is not revealed in the Court of 
Appeal judgment, but a subsequent television documentary revealed that she was forced to live 
in her car in a roadside layby following the separation. 
Valerie Burns has become symbolic of the law’s unfairness and harshness towards 
(predominantly female) homemakers (Bottomley 1998). However, more recent commentators 
have questioned the extent to which we can assume that women in unmarried heterosexual 
relationships continue to bear a resemblance to the traditional housewife that concerned 
feminist legal scholars in the 1980s and 1990s (Probert 2001; Auchmuty 2016). Widespread 
societal and political change has taken place since Burns was decided. Women’s participation 
in the workplace has continued to increase and, unless couples can afford to live on one wage, 
it is fairly unusual for one partner to have made no financial contributions at all towards the 
home. Furthermore, the state’s expectations of its citizens have shifted significantly. The male 
breadwinner/female homemaker model prevalent until the latter part of the twentieth century, 
has given way to an “adult worker model” (Smith 2014), whereby all citizens are expected to 
be economically active, regardless of caregiving obligations.   
However, while today’s caregiver often has greater financial autonomy than her 1980s 
counterpart, the questions of financial dependency, enforced domesticity, and feminisation of 
reproductive labour that feminists discussed three decades ago (and indeed far before this) have 
not been satisfactorily resolved. Instead, the situation of carers and the care debate has been 
complicated in ways that must be confronted by legal researchers. For example, the carer’s 
participation in the workplace brings additional challenges in terms of juggling the demands of 
work with those of the home. She may find her leisure time depleted, impacting on her physical 
and mental wellbeing. Furthermore, female members of the middle classes can purchase 
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financial autonomy by delegating their caregiving labour to more marginalised members of 
society, often migrants and women of colour (Meagher 2002).  
One problem remains relatively constant. While law and policy rely on increasingly gender-
neutral language to describe caregiving, such as recategorising maternity leave as shared 
parental leave, women continue to perform the majority of unpaid informal care and domestic 
work in the home (Crompton and Lyonette 2008, 2015).  Even where men perform caregiving 
work, their experiences are different to women’s, with women spending a greater number of 
hours providing care, receiving less support, and experiencing greater adverse physical and 
psychological effects (Pinquart and Sörensen 2006; Penning and Wu 2015). Women also tend 
to bear a greater ‘mental load’ in terms of having overall responsibility for coordinating the 
household, even if tasks are shared between partners (Everingham 2002; Hochschild 1983).  
Thus, while image of the caregiver has changed from a traditional housewife to an increasingly 
economically active (but overburdened) worker (Lewis 2001), care remains imagined as a 
female endeavour. Relief is available to those who can afford to purchase commodified caring 
services, but this entrenches class and racial divides and further marginalises those who are 
already oppressed (Roberts 1997; Luxton 2002).  
The Vulnerability Lens: Universal Vulnerability  
As outlined in the introduction, Fineman’s theory of vulnerability argues that all humans are 
inherently vulnerability by virtue of their embodied and socially embedded nature. Universal 
vulnerability is the starting point for Fineman, but her theory is ultimately a critique of the 
liberal state’s failure to respond to the vulnerable reality of humanity, preferring instead to 
promote an image of personhood as rational, self-sufficient, and able-bodied. This hypothetical 
liberal subject is fixed in time; its powers and capacities never deteriorating, its body never 
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ageing. This view of human nature is not only unrealistic, but actively harmful, as it stigmatises 
those who cannot conform to the invulnerable norm (Fineman 2008).  
While proponents of the universal thesis have argued that it is unhelpful to use the language of 
‘vulnerable populations’ (Fineman 2008, 2015; Travis and Garland 2018), they do 
acknowledge that universal vulnerability is not experienced uniformly. For instance, some 
people are incredibly wealthy, while others live in desperate poverty. Yet, this contrast does 
not mean that the rich are not vulnerable. Rather, it reflects that individuals possess varying 
levels of resilience, meaning material resources, capital wealth, and access to certain social 
networks and institutions (Fineman 2008; Travis 2018). Thus, a resilient individual is still 
inherently vulnerable, but she has the means to minimise the extent to which she is 
disadvantaged or restricted by it. The state distributes resilience unequally, but this is concealed 
by a dominant political rhetoric of personal responsibility, whereby the individual is blamed 
for failing to become resilient (Fineman 2010).  
Relational Vulnerability: A ‘More than Ordinary’ Vulnerability  
I theorise the relational vulnerability to which cohabiting carers are subject as an additional, or 
“more-than-ordinary” (Sellman 2005) vulnerability that exists in addition to the embodied 
vulnerability which affects all humans. While this approach may draw criticism of labelling 
cohabiting homemakers as a ‘vulnerable group’, I view it as an extension rather than a 
contradiction to the universal thesis. I do not deny the inherent vulnerability of the human 
condition, but I argue that this is not the only form of vulnerability. Instead, I view vulnerability 
as having a variety of sources, including social, environmental, and relational ones (Mackenzie 
et al. 2014; Lotz 2016). Being specific rather than general when discussing vulnerability, I 
argue, enhances understanding both how vulnerability is experienced and how it can be 
responded to.  
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While relational vulnerability is additional to universal vulnerability, the two concepts are 
inextricably linked. Relational vulnerability arises because, as Fineman (2017) argues, humans 
are both embodied and in need of care, and relationally embedded. In conceptualising 
relationality, I draw on Nedelsky’s (2011) concept of “nested relations”, which views the 
individual as situated within an extensive web of interactions, both with other individuals and 
with the state and its institutions, including law. Interpersonal relationships do not arise in a 
vacuum; they are shaped and governed by wider influences. Cohabiting carers are relationally 
vulnerable because they are situated within an unequal or unbalanced relational network. Their 
disadvantages cannot be attributed to poor personal choices (such as the decision to make 
career sacrifices or the decision to not get married). They arise because the state marginalises 
and devalues care, giving caregivers a low status within their relational networks. As a result, 
I argue, caregivers are exposed to economic, emotional, and spatial harms. Some people can 
emulate the unrealistic ideal of the liberal autonomous subject, but only because others are 
performing caregiving labour. However, because the state largely ignores or privatises care and 
dependency, it points to these unburdened individuals as representative of ideal citizenship, 
while stigmatising carers for failing to attain economic self-sufficiency.  
I do not view it as problematic to identify certain groups who experience additional 
vulnerabilities over and above the inherent biological vulnerability that affects us all. Fineman 
herself accepts that there are variations in levels of resilience between groups. To an extent, 
the conflict between our approaches is one of nomenclature. I could describe cohabiting carers 
as ‘less resilient’ rather than ‘vulnerable’, due to their reduced access to the resources that 
would help them withstand the impact of the inevitable vulnerability that affects us all. 
However, I argue that this would be an inadequate theorisation of their position. There is, in 
my view, importance in emphasising the conceptual distinction between vulnerability as the 
source of harm and resilience as the response to it. Cohabiting caregivers do not merely suffer 
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from an absence of resources. Rather, they are actively exploited by a state that draws 
significant benefits from their unpaid work without rewarding them, while simultaneously 
stigmatising them for failing to live up to an impossible self-sufficient ideal. The legal 
framework helps to perpetuate this exploitation. Thus, the label of more-than-ordinary 
vulnerability, instead of lack of resilience, helps to emphasise the state’s, and the law’s, role in 
creating harmful relational networks that disadvantage caregivers.  
Law’s Creation of Relational Vulnerability: The ‘Rational Subject’ and the ‘Altruistic 
Carer’ 
I now turn to the process by which the legal framework helps to situate cohabiting caregivers 
within an unequal relational network. The state’s devaluation of care is constant, pervasive, 
and entrenched. Its institutions, particularly the private family, are structured to privatise 
responsibility for caregiving and remove it from public concern (Fineman 2008). Care is 
decoupled from economic value, creating an illusion that ‘love is all you need’ to be a carer, 
ignoring that effective caregiving is dependent on access to adequate economic and social 
resources (Fineman 2004). Simultaneously, the neoliberal state’s veneration of financial 
independence reinforces carers’ low status because their unpaid caring responsibilities prevent 
them from complying with the economic ideal. Carers become trapped in an unbalanced 
relational framework: one that restricts choices and encourages unhealthy dependencies.  
The legal framework applicable to cohabitants directly contributes to the privatisation, 
gendering, and devaluation of care, and to the marginalisation of cohabiting carers. Law, as a 
state institution, has considerable discursive and coercive power to shape relationships between 
citizens, and between citizens and the state (Berkovitch 1997). Yet, law explicitly denies its 
social and political force, claiming instead to be neutral, rational, and apolitical (Fox-
O’Mahony 2014; Davies 2011). In the cases concerning cohabitants, judges frequently reiterate 
that they are limited to impartially determining the parties’ proprietary interests rather than 
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ensuring substantive fairness.17 Yet, even pronouncements such as this are politically loaded. 
Behind the façade of neutrality, the legal framework reinforces care as a gendered and 
sentimental endeavour. By positioning caregiving and relationality as inherently incompatible 
with the dispassionate logic of acquiring proprietary rights, law continually reiterates care’s 
low status. Property law’s dominant narratives construct caregivers as “outsiders” (Fox-
O’Mahoney 2014, 409), who do not belong within the legal framework.  
I argue that the case law relies on two distinct fictional images, against whom legal actors are 
assessed. The first is the rational subject; a person embodying the neoliberal, typically 
masculine, ideals of self-interest and economic self-sufficiency. The foil to this character is the 
altruistic carer, an inevitably feminine role that represents the extra-legal emotional realm. The 
altruistic carer character reinforces the notion that care is “the moral duty of the good wife, 
mother or daughter, with no economic value as such but which is performed in exchange for 
the male breadwinner’s legal and/or moral duty to provide financial support” (Barlow 2007, 
251). Neither character is a realistic representation of personhood. Instead, they operate in 
tandem to privatise, sentimentalise, and feminise care, enforcing its lack of belonging within 
the public sphere of property rights.  
Within the case law, the rational, self-interested legal subject and the feminine, self-sacrificing, 
altruistic carer are viewed as fundamentally incompatible. This has prompted judges to frame 
their narrative in such a way as to imbue legal actors with the characteristics necessary to 
emulate either of the two characters. In turn, this operates to either allow or deny compensation 
for caregiving. For instance, Flynn and Lawson’s (1995, 119) discussion of Wayling v Jones,18 
which involved caregiving and domestic work in the context of a male same-sex couple, noted 
the manner in which the court felt it necessary to “explain (and to elevate) [the claimant’s] 
                                                 
17 See e.g. Curran v Collins [2013] EWCA Civ 382, [19], (Toulson LJ) 
18 Wayling v Jones, n 15  
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domestic behaviour in the description of him acting as companion or chauffeur in exchange for 
monetary support”. More recently, in Culliford v Thorpe,19 which also involved a male same-
sex couple and the performance of unpaid domestic work, HHJ Matthews used notably 
contractual language, explaining that the court’s task was limited to “implementing the 
agreement- the informal bargain- between [the couple]”20. As in Wayling, what was a personal 
and intimate relation had to be moulded into a market-based transaction where the parties 
negotiated for their rights.  
The judicial commercialisation of personal relationships often glosses over evidence of 
affection and relationality, sometimes producing inconsistencies in reasoning. Thorner v 
Major,21 although it does not involve cohabitants, illustrates these contradictions. Here, the 
claimant (David) had worked unpaid on his father’s cousin’s (Peter) farm for 30 years, until 
the latter’s death. As Peter grew increasingly elderly, David had also assisted him with day-to-
day tasks. The House of Lords focused on David’s lost commercial opportunities in justifying 
an award. Other features of the case suggested that David would have helped Peter even if there 
was no suggestion of financial reward. David had provided substantial assistance to his parents 
for nominal pay for many years, suggesting a strong sense of family loyalty within him that 
outweighed any commercial motivations. Lord Scott also doubted whether David would have 
objected to the farm being sold to pay for Peter’s nursing care.22 In addition, owing to Peter 
being “a man of few words”23, much of the ‘bargaining’ took place through assumptions, 
gestures, and even silences, leaving judges to fill the gaps. While the House of Lords attempted 
to expand the limits of bargaining, emphasising that “the meaning to be ascribed to words 
                                                 
19 Culliford v Thorpe [2018] EWHC (Ch) 426  
20 Ibid, [78] (HHJ Paul Matthews)  
21 Thorner v Major, n 14 
22 Ibid, [19] (Lord Scott)  
23 Ibid, [70] (Lord Neuberger) 
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passing between parties will depend, often very much, on their factual context”,24 the lack of 
fit between complex relational contexts and the commercial demands of proprietary estoppel 
was evident.  
Where the claimant is female, courts are more likely to sentimentalise, rather than 
commercialise, her unpaid work, thereby denying her an interest in the home. The female 
claimant is cast in the role of altruistic carer, a character that is inherently incompatible with 
the notion of economic reward. This reflects the consistent feminisation of care within social 
and political discourse. In contrast to men, women are imagined as natural nurturers, fulfilling 
biological and social roles as mothers, wives, and daughters (Tronto 1994). Lord Bridge’s by 
now infamous speech on unpaid domestic work in Lloyds Bank v Rosset demonstrates the 
judicial tendency to see female domesticity and financial reward as inherently incompatible. 
As he reasoned: 
it would seem the most natural thing in the world for any wife, in the absence of 
her husband abroad, to spend all the time she could spare and to employ any skills 
she might have, such as the ability to decorate a room, in doing all she could to 
accelerate progress of the work quite irrespective of any expectation she might have 
of enjoying a beneficial interest in the property25 
 
As Lord Bridge’s words demonstrate, the feminine altruistic carer character is closely tied to 
perceived female heteronormative relational roles. As a wife, there were certain behavioural 
expectations on Mrs Rosset, echoing that, within heterosexual relationships, women are 
required to perform unpaid work in return for financial support from a male partner (Fudge 
2005; Pateman 1988).  
While modern-day judges would no doubt be hesitant to express their views quite as explicitly 
as Lord Bridge did, more recent cases show a continuing tendency to associate women’s work 
                                                 
24 Ibid, [80] (Lord Neuberger) 
25 Lloyds Bank v Rosset, n 6, p 131 (Lord Bridge)  
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with altruism. For instance, in James v Thomas, Sir John Chadwick dismissed the claimant’s 
claim for a constructive trust on the basis of unpaid work, explaining that: 
The true position, as it seems to me, is that [the claimant] worked in the business, 
and contributed her labour to the improvements to the property, because she and 
Mr Thomas making their life together as man and wife … It is a mistake to think 
that the motives which lead parties in such a relationship to act as they do are 
necessarily attributable to pecuniary self-interest.26 
As in Rosset, the claimant was cast in the wife-role, with its expectations of altruism and unpaid 
work. Sir John Chadwick emphasises that he sees a clear distinction between relational 
motivations and what he calls “pecuniary self-interest”. Similarly, in Thomson v Humphrey, 
where the claimant cared for the defendant’s elderly mother, Warren J reasoned that: 
There is absolutely nothing to link this conduct with the fact … that she had an 
interest in [the property]. The reason she looked after the defendant's mother 
was surely because she lived with the defendant and did this because of her 
relationship with him and perhaps, for all I know, and this is pure speculation, 
because she got on with and liked the defendant's mother and did it for her.27 
Both James and Thomson demonstrate that the existence of intimacy is thought to negate any 
question of financial reward. Where the claimant is male, there appears a greater tendency to 
downplay the intimacy in favour of bargaining behaviour. Conversely, domesticity is 
emphasised in cases involving female homemakers, fitting the claimant into the altruistic carer 
role. HHJ Paul Matthews, the judge in Culliford, also heard the case of Dobson v Griffey28 a 
few months later. Like Culliford, Dobson concerned an alleged assurance to share the home, 
coupled with unpaid domestic work. However, while the judge was able to find a bargain in 
Culliford, in Dobson, he resorted to drawing inferences regarding intention from the female 
claimant’s relational role, explaining that: 
Her labour and commitment were understandable in the context of their 
relationship and their intended long-term future together with children. This was 
                                                 
26 James v Thomas, n 8, [36] (Sir John Chadwick) 
27 Thomson v Humphrey, n 7, [43] (Warren J)  
28 Dobson v Griffey [2018] EWHC (Ch) 1117 
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to be her home, and that of her children. It is unnecessary to suppose some quasi-
commercial bargain between them to explain it.29 
The parties never did have children together, but the idea that this may have been a possibility 
was used to deny the claimant a remedy. It was “unnecessary” to go further than the fact that 
the claimant was simply doing what was expected of her in the context of a quasi-marital 
relationship.  
Elements and Temporality of Relational Vulnerability 
In this section, I consider how legal and social marginalisation comes to impact on cohabiting 
carers in various ways. In the literature and judicial discourse, relationship-generated 
disadvantage is discussed predominantly as a financial imbalance between the parties, and one 
that does not occur until the relationship breaks down. This, in my view, downplays the full 
extent of the impact on cohabiting carers of being situated within an unequal relational network. 
Instead, I argue, that the devaluation of caregiving labour exposes carers to a combination of 
economic, emotional, and spatial vulnerability. Furthermore, this vulnerability is potentially 
lifelong and cannot simply be temporally confined to the point of relationship breakdown.  
The Temporality of Relational Vulnerability   
The caregiver’s relational vulnerability is a fluctuating condition arising during the course of 
an intimate relationship, albeit that it usually concealed behind the structure of the private 
family at this time. It intensifies and gains visibility upon relationship breakdown, particularly 
if the caregiver seeks to replace her dependency on her partner with dependency on the state. 
However, much of it consists of the future uncertainties that are engendered by being a carer 
in the present-day.  
                                                 
29 Ibid, [84] (HHJ Paul Matthews)  
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Rendering temporalities visible can enrich critical legal scholarship (Kotiswaran 2015), 
particularly when considering how these temporalities interact with, and are shaped by, law 
(Grabham 2016). Time forms a significant, but often underexplored, component of 
vulnerability (whether inherent or more-than-ordinary). Universal vulnerability itself is tied to 
the temporal measure of the human lifespan, which moves through various stages, including 
infancy, childhood, adulthood, old age, and death. Some of these stages, notably infancy, 
render us completely dependent on receiving care from others, whereas at other points, our 
physical strength imbues us with “temporal powers” (Thompson 2014), bringing greater 
independence. However, time is unpredictable and to be human is to be vulnerable to the ever-
present risk of one’s life being disrupted by unforeseen events like accidents and illnesses (or 
these happening to those close to us), which, once again, bring about helplessness. 
While humans seek to exercise control over time, artificially categorising it and often using it 
as an instrument of exclusion (Grabham 2016; Adam 1995), true dominion over time’s passage 
is an impossibility. However, access to certain resources in the present day, such as pensions, 
health insurance, or real property, can help to provide a form of anchor to an otherwise 
uncertain future. A key component of the cohabiting carer’s relational vulnerability is an 
absence of such anchoring. Becoming a caregiver can set in motion a future trajectory of 
hardship; one that is difficult, or even impossible, to change once begun. Upon relationship 
breakdown, cohabiting carers may experience a sense of ‘lost’ or wasted time, with certain 
opportunities having disappeared forever, including promotions, acquiring a home of one’s 
own, accumulating savings, or even the chance of pursuing a more successful and stable 
intimate relationship with another person. A legal framework such as the existing one, that is 
unconcerned with future hardships, and instead conducts a retrospective relational survey to 
ascertain property rights, is inadequate for addressing this temporal aspect of relational 
vulnerability. 
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Economic Vulnerability 
Economic vulnerability refers to caregivers’ potentially harmful economic dependency, both 
on intimate partners and the state. While family law recognises that taking on caring 
responsibilities can have significant economic repercussions, it views these as arising when the 
relationship comes to an end, and relatively little attention is given to financial inequalities that 
arise during the relationship. However, empirical research suggests that, on the whole, women 
in heterosexual relationships have less access to spending money than men and may even spend 
less on food for themselves than other members of the household (Cantillon 2013). This reflects 
the gendered distribution of care and household work, and the fact that women are less likely 
to be the family breadwinner (Pahl 1983).  
The neoliberal state is largely unconcerned with unequal distribution of resources within the 
private family. As O’Donovan (1985, 12) has remarked, “[t]he couple is a unit, a black box, 
into which the law does not purport to peer. What goes on inside the box is not perceived to be 
the law’s concern”. This allows the state to remain restrained, delegating responsibility for 
dependency to the family. Policies presume that money is shared equally, but there is no 
remedy when it is not. Under the current Conservative government, this restraint is becoming 
ever-more explicit, evidenced for instance by the introduction of Universal Credit, which is 
paid only to the ‘household head’, leaving women (particularly black and BME women) at 
serious risk of financial hardship if their partner refuses to share the money (Sandhu 2016). 
Assumptions of equal sharing romanticise the private family, glossing over inequalities and 
harms that occur beneath its idealised surface. Often, arguments in favour of law reform for 
cohabitants is structured around notions of sharing and interdependency. For instance, Gardner 
(1993) argues that the law should acknowledge cohabiting relationships that are “materially 
communal”, meaning that “[the parties] pool their material resources (including money, other 
assets, and labour” (Gardner and MacKenzie 2015, 3.7). This view is echoed in both Stack v 
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Dowden and Jones v Kernott. In Jones, the “emotional and economic commitment to a joint 
enterprise”30 was used as justification for the presumption of equal shares in joint ownership 
cases. In Stack, the issue of intermingling of finances was seen as being of particular 
importance in demonstrating the parties’ intentions. The fact that the couple had kept their 
finances “rigidly separate”31 meant that the presumption of equal sharing could be rebutted.  
Although the tendency towards communitarianism in joint ownership cases may appear a 
welcome departure from property law’s traditional individualism, there is a danger of giving 
too much weight to the presence or absence of shared access to finances in cohabiting couples. 
Research has suggested that cohabitants are less likely than married couples to merge their 
finances and operate a joint account (Elizabeth 2001; Burgoyne et al. 2011). However, this fact 
does not by itself indicate greater financial equality between the partners. While separate 
finances may be a sign of autonomy and independence where the parties have equal access to 
financial resources, it can also signal the opposite where there is disparity in income positions. 
Geary v Rankine32 illustrates the dangers of law giving too much weight to the absence of 
sharing. Here, the parties had been together for 19 years and had a child. Throughout the 
relationship, Mr Rankine had refused to put his guesthouse business and an investment property 
into joint names despite Ms Geary having provided significant assistance with the business, 
giving up her job to do so. There were also hints at financial abuse, with Ms Geary asserting 
that “throughout our relationship the Respondent was mean with money […] If I asked the 
Respondent for money to spend on myself other than small amounts, there would always be an 
argument and he would become angry so I eventually did not ask.”33 Responding directly to 
the allegations regarding Mr Rankine’s refusal to share assets with Ms Geary, Lewison LJ 
                                                 
30 Jones v Kernott, n 12, [19] (Lord Walker and Lady Hale)  
31 Stack v Dowden, n 10, [92] (Baroness Hale) 
32 Geary v Rankine [2012] EWCA Civ 555 
33 Ibid, [7]  
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thought that “[t]hose points to my mind contradict any conclusion that she had an entitlement 
to a share in profits of the business.”34 Thus, Ms Geary’s failure to place her relationship within 
the idealistic dominant paradigm worked to her detriment, and the court was unconcerned with 
the inherently unbalanced financial dynamic between the parties.  
Highlighting its temporally fluctuating nature, the true extent of economic vulnerability is often 
delayed until later in life. Being a carer substantially affects one’s ability to make financial 
provision for retirement and old age. Women are more likely than men to experience older-age 
poverty, which has been attributed to their greater likelihood to have engaged in homemaker 
roles, including childcare and elder care (Orel et al. 2007; Ekerdt and Hackney 2002). While 
women today are more likely to be engaged in paid employment than in the past, they are less 
likely than men to have access to adequate employer pension schemes that will alleviate 
financial hardship in old age (Gough 2001). Even if their current caring obligations are time-
limited (e.g. raising children), women have far a greater likelihood than men of their futures 
becoming punctuated by “disruptive life events” (Orel et al. 2004), including obligations of 
care for elderly parents or other relatives, often in conjunction with still caring for dependent 
children (Hooyman et al. 2002). In today’s neoliberal era, where the welfare state is in retreat 
and caring services are becoming increasingly privatised, it is likely that expectations on 
women to perform elderly-care will intensify.  
Emotional Vulnerability  
I use the term emotional vulnerability to refer to the feelings of powerlessness, stress, and worry 
that accompany economic and spatial vulnerability. It results from unbalanced relational 
frameworks, where the carer’s autonomy is subverted, and she comes to lack control over her 
decisions. Since money, and control of money, carries substantial social power (Zelizer 1997), 
                                                 
34 Ibid, [13] (Lewison LJ)  
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the state’s failure to provide resources directly to carers, forcing them to become dependent on 
partners, amounts to disempowerment. As Burgoyne (2004, 165) has argued, “the power that 
comes with being the breadwinner can be much more subtle and that even a joint account does 
not guarantee an equal say”. This is also borne out in Pahl’s (1989, 174) early research on 
married couples, which found that “husbands were more likely to dominate in decision-making 
where the wife did not have a job… conversely wives who were dominant in decision-making 
were usually in paid employment”. More recently, a study of cohabitants identified so-called 
“uneven couples” characterised by power imbalances within the relationship, often also linked 
to financial inequality (Barlow and Smithson 2010). By delegating responsibility for caregiving 
to the private family, thus encouraging economic dependency, the state is placing carers at 
increased risk of exploitation by partners. Although economic dependency does not in itself 
cause exploitation, it produces conditions in manipulative or abusive behaviour to take root, as 
seen in Geary v Rankine.  
Emotional harm does not merely result from the intimate relationship dynamic, but also from 
the carer’s interaction with the state and its institutions. Caregivers’ low social status can lead 
them to suffer so-called “harm to citizenship entitlements” from being treated as unproductive 
members of society (Rai et al. 2014, 92). Care is made incompatible with the autonomous ideals 
of citizenship because financial dependency (which is almost an inevitability for carers) under 
the liberal model is seen as “evidence of a failing to attain or retain autonomous agency” 
(Dodds 2007, 501). As Young (1995, 547) argues, “normatively privileging independence … 
and making it a primary virtue of citizenship implies judging a huge number of people in liberal 
societies as less than full citizens”.  
While the move from the female caregiver ideal to the adult worker model has improved 
women’s financial autonomy, it has also added potential additional psychological burdens on 
carers. The “second-shift” phenomenon refers to having to perform double duties in the home 
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and the workplace, and the negative physical and emotional consequences that ensue 
(Hochschild and Machung 2012). As I discussed above, combining employment and 
caregiving is often dependent on being able to delegate care to others. However, this ability is 
not equally available to all, and requires access to financial resources. Whereas many middle-
class, high-earning women can purchase help with childcare, lower-income immigrant women 
are more likely to be the ones to whom this care work is delegated. In turn, these women’s 
second shifts can become even more pressured, having to combine professional caregiving with 
meeting the needs of their own families (Williams 2010). Yet this strain on more marginalised 
groups of women is often masked by (predominantly) white affluent women’s increased 
presence in the workplace.  
Because emotional vulnerability extends beyond the interactions between intimate partners, it 
can also continue after relationship breakdown. With the loss of the relationship’s masking 
effect, the carer’s economic dependency becomes publicly visible and she may need to support 
herself through the state welfare system. This process can take a significant emotional toll. 
Loxton’s (2005) research on single mothers in Australia found that worries about an uncertain 
financial future were a common theme, caused partly by an inability to make long-term 
financial provision by way of savings or home ownership. As she explains, “sole mothers 
described their futures as ‘bleak’, ‘scary’, ‘daunting’ and ‘not good’” (Loxton 2005, 42). Carers 
who are reliant on state benefits are also at constant risk that a change in political climate will 
lead to existing support being withdrawn. For the past 40 years, the state has tended towards 
increasingly neoliberal policies (Barlow et al. 2017). Welfare provisions have been gradually 
eroded, with an enhanced emphasis on self-sufficiency and personal responsibility. This can 
be a significant source of concern and stress for carers, with uncertainty over whether current 
schemes for assistance, such as the state pension, will even exist in the future.  
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Spatial Vulnerability 
Spatial vulnerability refers to the harm that results from having an insecure relationship to one’s 
home, both during the relationships and in the future. The embodied nature of humanity means 
that, as well as existing in a web of interpersonal and citizen-state relations, we also have 
connections to the spaces that we inhabit. Human wellbeing is dependent on being able to live 
somewhere that is secure, both in a physical and a temporal sense, and for the relationship 
between individual and space to be protected and respected by the state. Strong spatial 
relationships are of particular importance for caregivers because care is directly dependent on 
a suitable space in which it can be performed (Williams 2002).  
The home is a powerful combination of physical space, discourse, and ideology, and has been 
recognised as a source of individual identity, autonomy and security (Saunders 1989; Radin 
1982). The idealised home has also become symbolic of a private sphere, offering a sanctuary 
and respite from the harshness of the outside world (Chapman and Hockey 1999). While 
individuals develop psychological connections to their homes over time through living in them 
and experiencing various life events (Gurney 1997), law also plays an influential role in terms 
of home as a source of identity and security. For example, Saunders (1989) has suggested that 
legal ownership engenders a stronger sense of security compared to rental accommodation. 
This perceived difference between the owned and the rented home has partly been explained 
on the level of control that the individual is able to exercise in relation to her spatial 
surroundings (Easthope et al. 2015). Ridgway et al. (1994, 413) have furthermore argued that 
“empowerment … comes from controlling access to personal space, from being able to alter 
one’s environment and select one’s daily routine, and from having personal space that reflects 
and upholds one’s identity and interests”.  
Rather than existing in a state of nature, legal property regimes are socially constructed and 
reflect societal norms and goals (Davies 2007). Laws of ownership involve the state making 
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decisions as to who belongs where, often reflecting gendered and racialised patterns, whereby 
dominant groups are deemed to belong, and marginalised groups are not (Keenan 2017). 
Cohabiting carers often have insecure legal relationships to their home. Where the carer is not 
a legal owner, she is invisible in the eyes of the law, having no formal rights to occupy and 
only limited rights to remain in the event of relationship breakdown. Her presence within her 
home depends entirely on her intimate relationship with the legal owner continuing, creating a 
significant imbalance in power and control within the relationship. If she is unable to show 
evidence of an intention to share beneficial ownership, there is no formal recognition of her 
relationship to her home, even if she has a strong emotional connection to it or has lived there 
for a long time.  
Where the home is jointly owned, the carer is still vulnerable to its loss. Even if she acquires 
half the value of the home, her reduced financial status will impact on her ability to find a 
suitable alternative home. In fact, a lump sum may be more of a hindrance than a help to her 
as it will affect her eligibility for state benefits while her caring obligations will reduce her 
mortgage capacity.35 Relationship breakdown can therefore bring about a precarious living 
situation, where the carer is forced to rent in the private sector, with its attendant spatial 
insecurities and hostilities. While owner-occupied housing provides a certain amount of future 
security, assured shorthold tenancies can be terminated at short notice and are reliant on the 
tenant continuing to have an earning capacity into old age.  
Carer Resilience: Evaluating State Responses 
In this final section, I briefly consider how the state can respond to relational vulnerability. In 
common with other vulnerability theorists, I employ the term ‘resilience’, denoting an 
individual’s ability to withstand or overcome harmful effects of vulnerability. Fineman views 
                                                 
35 The capital limit for means-tested benefits is £16,000.  
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resilience as a set of resources, which can be “physical, human, social, ecological or 
environmental, and existential” (Fineman 2017, 146). Access to these resources is controlled 
by the state and its institutions and, within the neoliberal state, they are unequally distributed 
across the population. However, Fineman (2017, 146) stresses that, while resilience “provides 
an individual with the means and ability to recover from harm, setbacks and the misfortunes 
that affect our lives”, it can never fully eliminate inherent human vulnerability.  
As Lotz (2016) has argued, vulnerability scholarship largely neglects resilience as a theoretical 
concept. Although resilience is described as a set of state-distributed resources (Fineman 2010), 
questions about its normative commitments remain unaddressed under the universal thesis. In 
the context of cohabiting carer vulnerability, further interrogation of what it means to be 
resilient is needed. In contrast to universal vulnerability, relational vulnerability is avoidable 
and capable of at least partial elimination. For cohabiting carers to become relationally 
resilient, the unequal relational structures in which they are situated must therefore be 
rebalanced.  
To become resilient, cohabiting carers must be given access to social and material resources. 
Without these, effective caregiving cannot take place. However, to genuinely foster resilience, 
the state’s distribution of resources must also have an identifiable underlying normative 
commitment to promote positive and empowering relational networks. Here, I draw on 
Leckey’s and Nedelsky’s arguments that positive relational contexts are ones characterised by 
equality and autonomy (Nedelsky 2011; Leckey 2008). It is important to note that both these 
concepts are being used in a relational sense here. Equality is not mere sameness of treatment, 
but a commitment towards equal outcomes, and equal status for caregivers and their 
breadwinner partners. Simultaneously, autonomy is defined as relational, recognising that, 
contrary to the classical liberal view, interpersonal connections and commitments are not 
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necessarily an impediment to autonomy and that, to be autonomous, we must be recognised as 
such by others (Nedelsky 2011; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000).  
I will now examine two potential modes of state response to cohabiting carers. The first is to 
achieve resilience through the distribution of privately-owned assets. The second is through 
state subsidy schemes, where state institutions provide material resources directly to carers. In 
the below, rather brief, discussion, I do not intend to posit a legal solution to relational 
vulnerability. Instead, I am evaluating the extent to which these two different responses address 
the normative goals of autonomy and equality, prompting a more holistic approach towards 
reform in this area.  
Private Property 
The most common way of dealing with the financial implications of relationship breakdown is 
through discretionary or fixed judicial redistribution of assets owned by the partners. Such 
schemes exist for married couples and civil partners in England and Wales and also extend to 
cohabitants in a number of other jurisdictions. The Law Commission has recommended that 
cohabitants be granted a statutory right to claim financial relief from a former partner, partially 
modelled on the Scottish regime under the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 (Law Commission 
2007). While judicial redistribution usually only applies on relationship breakdown, some 
jurisdictions also operate community of property, whereby all assets of the partners are treated 
as being jointly owned. Community of property can be immediate, as it is in South Africa, 
where joint ownership takes effect from the date of the marriage. Alternatively, community can 
be deferred, coming into effect only when the relationship breaks down and operating only in 
respect of certain assets, for example the family home (Cooke et al. 2006; Barlow and Lind 
1999).  
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State responses based around privately owned property (whether through redistribution or 
community of property) have certain advantages over direct state subsidies. Certain assets, 
most notably the family home, are of such high economic value that they could never be 
matched by state payments. Private property-based schemes can also address some of the 
temporal aspects of relational vulnerability, particularly spatial vulnerability. The potentially 
ever-lasting nature of homeownership and the level of control over space that ownership brings 
has significant advantages over other forms of housing and, through awarding property rights, 
feelings of insecurity over the future can at least be mitigated. A deferred community of 
property scheme that is based around giving the caregiver rights to the family home also has 
the potential to recognise the home’s unique combination of economic, emotional, and spatial 
resilience that cannot be replicated through regular monetary payments (Fox 2007; Radin 
1982).  
Private property regimes can directly address the imbalance that occurs when one partner is 
able to amass wealth as a result of the other’s assumption of caregiving responsibilities. 
However, this depends on the particular aims that redistribution or community seek to achieve. 
For instance, the Matrimonial Causes Act gives judges substantial discretion to achieve 
“fairness”,36 whereas the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 only aims to correct economic 
advantage or disadvantage that has arisen in cohabiting relationships.37  
While private property has some attractions, by itself, it is insufficient to fully redress relational 
vulnerability. Neither redistribution, nor community of property, tackle power imbalances 
during the relationship. Community of property is arguably more powerful than redistribution 
in this sense, as it is framed in terms of giving carers an automatic entitlement to assets, rather 
being framed in terms of the stronger partner having to give assets up. However, neither scheme 
                                                 
36 See White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 
37 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 28 (3)  
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can ensure equal distribution of resources within the private family unit. Another problem is 
that private property responses are only of use where the family in fact has adequate capital to 
ensure financial autonomy on relationship breakdown. As house prices rise and wages stagnate, 
home ownership is becoming increasingly unrealistic for the younger generations. An 
increasingly volatile political landscape that is marred by financial crises means that, even for 
those who do own property, its future value is not as secure as it once was. Therefore, whereas 
private property can offer equality and autonomy for the middle classes, those who are already 
at the margins of society, and who often experience the burdens of caregiving particularly 
acutely, are less likely to be assisted by such a scheme.  
Private property responses, particularly discretionary redistribution, also place a burden on 
caregivers to enforce their rights, while the state remains restrained. In this sense, they do not 
remove the carer from the patterns of financial dependency that characterise economic 
vulnerability. If a respondent refuses to comply with legal proceedings, the carer may have to 
resort to depleting family assets to enforce her entitlement, which will impact on her ability to 
gain resilience. Over the past two decades, successive governments have drastically curtailed 
the availability of legal aid for family law disputes,38 meaning that those who cannot afford to 
pay for legal representation are forced to self-represent in the courts. As Barlow et al. (2017) 
have argued, the neoliberal state is increasingly restrained; placing responsibility on citizens to 
resolve their disputes privately and offering only very limited assistance to ensure that justice 
is done. Any private property response will therefore only be meaningful if it is accompanied 
by state measures that ensure genuine access to justice through legal aid, something that seems 
unlikely in the current political climate.  
                                                 
38 The most dramatic cuts took place under the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 
which removed from scope the majority of private family law matters (including actions for a constructive trust 
or proprietary estoppel), unless an applicant can show evidence of domestic abuse.  
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State Subsidy 
An alternative option is that reallocation of private property be abandoned in favour of a more 
active state intervention in the form of a direct financial subsidy from the state that is paid in 
respect of care (or other socially reproductive work) that is performed in the home. This would 
take the form of non-means tested and unconditional cash payments from the state to the 
individual who works in the home. It is envisaged that such payments would subsidise 
caregivers who do not engage in paid work at all, as well as assisting those who work part-
time, thus reducing the impact of the second shift. Models of this nature have been proposed 
by feminists as a means of directly rewarding unpaid labour in the home, as seen in Fraser’s 
(1994) “caregiver parity model”, and in the Wages for Housework movement during the 1970s 
and 1980s (Federici 1975; Dalla Costa and James 1973). A version of this model (albeit limited 
to childcare rather than a broader range of socially reproductive work) is the Nordic ‘cash for 
childcare’ initiatives, whereby parents who elect not to make use of state-subsidised childcare 
are given cash payments instead, which can be retained by the family or spent on purchasing 
private care services.39 Cash for care schemes differ substantially from the current state welfare 
scheme in this country, because it is envisaged that payments would be made as a direct 
recognition of the value of care and socially reproductive work, and its non-means tested nature 
would avoid problems of stigma and scrutiny. 
In contrast to private property schemes where the state is relatively restrained, caregiver 
subsidies involve a direct state response to relational vulnerability and, importantly, one that 
would place a monetary value on socially reproductive labour, working towards ending its 
status as an emotional and unproductive endeavour. In this sense, state subsidy carries genuine 
                                                 
39 The Finnish scheme, Kotohoidontuki, was introduced in 1985 and is available in respect of children aged 1- 
3 (www.kela.fi (accessed 23 August 2018)). The Norwegian scheme, Kontantstøtte, was introduced in 1998 
and is available for children aged 1-2 (www.nav.no (accessed 23 August 2018)). The Swedish scheme, 
Vårdnadsbidrag was introduced in 2008 and is available for children aged 1-2 (www.forsakringskassan.se 
(accessed 23 August 2018)). 
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transformative potential in seeking to challenge the current privatisation and devaluation of 
care, which in turn can have broader societal consequences.  
As payments would be made throughout the relationship, rather than only on its breakdown, 
state subsidy has greater potential than private property to enhance caregiver autonomy during 
the relationship. Having access to resources during a relationship, even limited ones, can 
enhance decision-making power and raise self-esteem (Pahl 1988). Research has also shown 
that financial dependency is frequently a significant obstacle to women being able to leave 
abusive or harmful relational contexts (Goldsack 1999), which could also be addressed through 
state subsidy.  
Notwithstanding the above, it is important not to overstate the impact of state subsidy. The 
problem is not merely that the current law fails to reward cohabiting caregivers, but also that it 
contributes to care’s gendered nature by imagining caregiving as a predominantly female 
activity. State subsidy can indeed seek to raise the status of care by linking it to financial 
reward, but it is maybe overly optimistic to imagine that this alone would persuade men to take 
up an equal share of the work. There is a risk, as Craig has argued, that state subsidies “would 
not necessarily give women the freedom not to provide care” (Craig 2008, 48). In fact, there is 
a danger that socially constructed gender-roles could be even further entrenched, trapping 
women in the home, and restricting their ability to gain freedom through paid work. This 
concern has been raised specifically in relation to the Nordic schemes, and it is notable that 
these initiatives have been championed largely by right-wing governments and are used mainly 
by women from immigrant or lower socio-economic backgrounds (Nelander 2007; Ellingsæter 
2012). Therefore, caution should be exercised in relation to state subsidy. For radical change 
to happen, the state must tackle the unequal and gendered distribution of caregiving work. State 
payments alone are unlikely to achieve this without further social reform and a fundamental 
reconceptualisation of care and other social reproduction.  
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There is insufficient space in this article to adequately discuss the ideal legal solution to carers’ 
relational vulnerability. However, as the above discussion demonstrates, it is important that 
reformers consider a full range of responses, rather than simply opting for the familiarity of 
private property distribution. Private property, through distribution or community, certainly 
has attractions in terms of formally recognising relationships between caregivers and their 
homes. However, it is an unsatisfactory response if it will only assist the small sector of 
cohabiting carers where there are sufficient assets to enable financial independence post-
separation, and if it does little to address the gendered split of caregiving labour. I am in favour 
of a more holistic response from the state, potentially drawing on elements of both state subsidy 
and private property, recognising that the work that carers perform is as vital to society’s 
function as paid economic work and is therefore deserving of a wage in the same way as paid 
work. However, the precise details of such an imagined scheme lie beyond the scope of this 
article.  
Conclusion  
This article has reframed through a relational vulnerability lens the existing feminist concerns 
over the legal status of cohabiting caregivers. Drawing and expanding upon the existing 
scholarship around universal vulnerability, I sought to explain relational vulnerability as an 
additional, or ‘more than ordinary’ susceptibility to harm arising when the state positions 
certain sectors of the population within unequal or unbalanced relational networks. Therefore, 
the disadvantages faced by cohabiting caregivers cannot be explained through private 
individual choice but must instead be viewed in the broader context of a state that consistently 
seeks to devalue and marginalise care. Nor can these disadvantages be seen as purely economic, 
as the embodied and relational nature of humanity means that cohabiting carers are also 
exposed to harm on an emotional and a spatial level.  
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The judicial tendency to commercialise male domesticity while emphasising the altruistic 
nature of female caregiving is symptomatic of the state’s wider perception of care as gendered 
and privatised, holding little to no value outside the individual family unit. This is particularly 
problematic in a modern society where economic self-sufficiency is now expected of all 
citizens and where the state is increasingly restrained. While today’s caregiver is more likely 
to be engaged in economic work (and can thus be distinguished from her late 20th century 
counterpart), the pressures upon her due to the state’s lack of support have arguably intensified 
and been rendered more complex.  
The state has a duty to remedy the unsatisfactory conditions it has created for cohabiting carers. 
Carers need to be made resilient through the strengthening of their relational networks. Seeking 
to address the criticism that vulnerability theorists have tended to neglect resilience somewhat, 
I considered the normative foundations of resilience, suggesting that it should be based around 
a promotion of relational autonomy and substantive equality. Using this normative framework, 
I analysed two potential modes of state response; private property and state subsidy. The aim 
here was not to propose a definitive solution to the existing problems, but to compare the extent 
to which two opposing forms of state intervention can achieve the dual goals of autonomy and 
equality. As outlined, it is likely that the state will need to employ elements of both subsidy 
and private property to adequately respond to relational vulnerability.  
Whichever way a state response is framed, it is imperative that there is a response. The current 
situation is both untenable and unjust. However, it is equally important that reform debates 
move beyond their current parameters. Cohabiting carers are relationally vulnerable due to the 
state’s failure to value or support them, not due to autonomous choices to compromise earning 
capacity. Genuine resilience will not be possible without express acknowledgment of the state’s 
role in producing caregiver vulnerability.  
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